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‘ “The tragedy of the private”: owners, communities and the state in South 
Africa’s land reform program’1 in Benda Beckmann, F von, K von Benda 
Beckmann, M Wiber (eds) Changing Properties of Property. 
Deborah James 
Anthropology Department 
LSE 
Introduction 
The distribution of property, as many of the papers in the present volume suggest, lies 
at the heart of debates over equity and social justice.  This is particularly true at 
moments of political change when former property regimes are critically scrutinized 
and reforms proposed. In such settings, a debate of several centuries’ standing is 
continually replayed: between those viewing private property rights as the foundation 
of society’s economic and civil order and those advocating the restriction of private 
property in order to secure it for the “public good” (Hann 1998:13).  
 
A modern-day version of this dispute is being played out between participants in 
South Africa’s post-1994 land reform programme.  The state, while aiming to 
transforming the racial profile of land ownership, is committed to achieving this 
through the transfer of land from one private owner to another.  Critics of state land 
policy, including human rights lawyers and NGO activists and those whose rights 
they claim to defend, have reservations about this. Although it was the apartheid 
regime that removed millions of people from tenancies in the white areas of South 
Africa into the African Bantustans (Platzky and Walker 1985), it did ensure some 
protection to land occupiers in these Bantustans through a racially distorted form of 
welfarism. It is to a future in which such forms of protection will be less assured, and 
to the associated threat of ultimate land alienation, that emerging forces in civil 
society have objected.  Claiming that “we cannot buy what already belongs to us”, 
organisations such as the Landless People’s Movement demonstrate – ironically - a 
commitment to the apartheid model of communal landholding under the rubric of 
state ownership which formerly applied in the bantustans. This clinging to older ideas 
about property in the face of change is reminiscent of similar patterns in post-socialist 
Europe.  
                                                 
1 The research for this paper was conducted as part of a project, funded by the UK’s ESRC (award 
reference number R000239795), entitled “Property, community and citizenship in South Africa’s Land 
Reform Programme”.  Thanks to all whom I interviewed; to those who offered help and support while I 
was in the field – particularly Patrick Pearson, David and Jenepher James, and Belinda Bozzoli; to the 
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The dispute thus counterposes two positions.  One, in line with the assertion in “The 
tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968) that resources owned in common are misused 
since no-one takes responsibility for them, is that securing land ownership on a 
private and individual basis can provide certainty about rights and responsibilities. 
The other is that the true “tragedy” lies in ensuring or perpetuating the private 
ownership of land, since this threatens either to lead to its eventual alienation from its 
new owners, or to make it effectively unusable by placing it under “community” 
control without state support. It is anxieties about the latter which will be illustrated 
by case studies in this paper. 
 
In disputes about land ownership, the new approach promoted by the state is pitted 
against putatively old-fashioned visions of landholding.  The resulting dichotomy – 
between modern/private and traditional/state-owned - harks back to the apartheid era.  
Although the planned-for reforms will result in a wide variety of tenurial types, 
depending on whether the land in question is in the former communal areas or on the 
privately-owned farms of white South Africa, some land activists nonetheless express 
anxiety that a bipolar division looks set to be further entrenched overall. As is the case 
in other transforming regimes, however, the boundaries between these apparently 
opposed polarities are blurred (see Sikor, this volume). Neither “traditional” nor 
“modern” is quite what it may seem.  The traditional models of landholding now 
defended by poorer landless people were less the product of pre-colonial experience 
than the result of apartheid’s extensive planning regimes.2  Conversely, forms of 
ownership now endorsed by the state, although private, transfer land to communities 
rather than individuals.  
 
State planning also involves a blurring of boundaries.  While the present regime is 
committed to privatising land, like other assets, it currently relies on a public 
legal/bureaucratic planning apparatus in order to achieve this.  Such has been the 
complexity of the new frameworks generated, however, that they have in turn 
required the intervention of private consultants for their design and implementation.  
                                                                                                                                            
organizers of and participants in the Changing Properties of Property conference at the Max Planck 
Institute of Anthropology, Halle, Germany, for providing the opportunity to present this paper.  
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These private consultants nonetheless act on behalf of and are paid by the state. Here, 
as in post-socialist Europe, “new intermediate layers emerge between private actors 
and government, combining private and public elements” (Sikor, this volume) which 
interweave in a bewildering manner.  Ownership becomes so complicated that some 
local actors, by contrast, idealize apartheid’s earlier system of custodial/state 
ownership.   
 
Private ownership carries different implications for richer and poorer people 
respectively. For both, the promise of autonomy is tenuously counterbalanced against 
the dangers of operating with somewhat less state support. For poorer people – the 
focus of the present paper - a system of private property based on market forces has 
returned land to dispossessed communities, or encouraged aspirant owners to pool 
their resources to buy new land.  The state aims to transfer ownership of farms to 
these groups, thus privatising responsibility for development, social services, and the 
adjudication of disputes.  Activists point to the resulting lack of clarity on the nature 
of rights and responsibilities, on how disputes between communal owners are to be 
resolved, and on exactly who is entitled to make decisions about land use.  Where 
communal owners do, despite such uncertainties, succeed in using landed property as 
loan collateral, debts incurred by individuals threaten to deprive whole groups of their 
land. Lobbying by NGOs has challenged the state in its intention to transfer 
responsibility for such lands, pointing out that it is the fully alienable nature of land 
entailed in unprotected ownership which renders its owners vulnerable.  The role of 
chieftaincy is also now part of the debate. Despite the fact that chiefs were thought of 
as deeply compromised during the apartheid era, their obligation to protect their 
subjects is cited by many as a reason for retaining apartheid’s “customary”/chief-
based models of landholding with state protection as a backup.   
 
In South Africa, as in the New Zealand case described in this volume, “ownership, in 
the process of constant change, has become more ambiguous than ever before” (van 
Meijl, this volume). Owners must attempt to pursue the freedom of private ownership 
while safeguarding themselves from its vulnerability by calling for assistance from a 
state increasingly unwilling to supply it.  They must juggle the demands of communal 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Murray (1992:132. passim). Apartheid planning is described by Bank, after Rabinow (1989), as 
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responsibility against the risk-taking of the individual entrepreneur.  This entails 
balancing the promises of modernity against the security of the well-trodden path.   
What makes these interlinked juggling acts necessary, but what also renders them 
particularly difficult, is their setting in a transitional social context in which many 
institutional and legal apparatuses are being consciously and deliberately redesigned.  
The “extraordinary degree of planning” endured by Africans during apartheid (Crush 
and Jeeves 1993) has required equivalent levels of planning, by state officials as well 
as those in the NGO sector, in order to undo apartheid’s schemes.  At the same time, 
the social forms of the old order – and the expectations which these engendered – 
have an extraordinary tenacity; in part because the elaborate designs to supplant these 
forms are taking so long to be realized.  The aspirant black South African landowner 
of the early 21st century is like an explorer setting forth in a rickety old ship, relying 
on the stars for guidance because more complex technological navigational systems 
are still being perfected.  Set against the promise of new lands to be gained is the fear 
of old lands lost.  
 
Land Reform and Communal Property: laws, models and precedents 
The symbolic and economic implications of South Africa’s land reform have been 
difficult to square. Arousing millennial expectations and exaggerated fears, land 
policies have been charged with conflicting tasks. The aim, on a symbolic level, is to 
restore lost citizenship and nationhood.  On a practical level, land reform is counted 
upon to create a new and prosperous class of African farmers and to ameliorate 
unemployment and rural poverty. At the same time, it is expected to resolve racial 
tensions which it, itself, has partly created.  
 
From the outset, the program acknowledged the diversity of land reform’s intended 
“beneficiaries” – and the complex interplay of moral and economic motivations - by 
subdividing its intended activities into three categories: restitution, redistribution and 
tenure reform. In theory, this would allow for the restoration of historical property 
rights as well as satisfying the demands of redistributive justice. In the program’s 
initial conceptualisation, lands were to be returned, not to “tribes” as in New Zealand, 
but to African titleholders who had lost their property during the apartheid era as a 
                                                                                                                                            
embodying “middling modernism” (2002).  
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result of forced removals: both strategies excluded large-scale dispossession in the 
19th century (van Meijl, this volume).  Subsequent negotiations by land activists on 
behalf of their constituents broadened the remit of restitution to include the holders of 
“informal rights” – including some “tribes” - as well as the holders of formal title.  
But restitution has, in practice, proved so cumbersome a process that many of those 
convinced that their claims fall within its remit have been left to satisfy their demands 
for land by means of redistribution. This sub-category of land reform enabled people 
such as tenants and farm workers to pool their government grants and buy farms: it 
increasingly seemed the only effective way of transferring significant amounts of 
white-owned land to the historically oppressed. Finally, tenure reform aimed to 
safeguard the rights on residents of white farms and state land in the former 
homelands. It was designed to protect poor people from summary eviction by 
securing their existing rights, or buy alternative land on which they could live.  
 
The programme has received inadequate funding, however, to make this combination 
of moral with material objectives possible (Walker 2001; Hall and Williams 
2003:104).  Nonetheless, the reform and/or restoration of land has remained a fulcrum 
for fierce disputes: over public responsibility versus private enterprise, welfarism 
versus self-reliance, traditional-style leadership versus egalitarian democracy, and 
private property versus land as an inalienable right. 
 
During the first few years after the 1994 election, South Africa’s new “land 
reformers” – both in state and NGO sectors – designed new forms of legislation to 
provide a legal framework for the ownership of land restored to the communities who 
formerly owned it.  The CPA (Communal Property Association) Bill was drafted and 
approved by Parliament in 1995, and the CPA Act passed in 1996 (SAIRR 1995-
6:369; Klug 1996:194-5).3  It stipulates that each CPA must have a constitution, a 
system of governance such that individual members elect a committee, a means of 
transferring property upon the death of individual members, and the like.  
 
Almost a decade after its original design, the CPA has been much criticized.  It is 
seen, on the one hand, as inadequately geared to the needs of particular kinds of 
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communities for particular kinds of ownership, but on the other as attempting to cater 
for these kinds of special needs in a paternalistic way.  Where one set of 
commentators calls it a land reform “ ‘product’… ill-matched with the real needs and 
capacities of the rural poor” and criticizes it for assuming too much in the way of 
experience and leadership on the part of rural leaders, another view disparages it for 
assuming that African people are different from other property owners in being 
inherently “communal”, and thus for stultifying all entrepreneurial initiatives.4 
 
The new “land reform” ownership model is, then, both denounced for embodying an 
inferior ownership specific to Africans and for being too complicated for rural 
Africans to understand: it is either insufficiently - or overly - different from normal 
ownership.  It balances communal against individual, and public against private, in an 
uneasy combination. As a model it is not unprecedented.  But it would be inaccurate 
to see it as rooted in African tradition.  Instead, it combines diverse - even 
contradictory - social, political and intellectual influences.   
 
When dispossessed African titleholders struggled to reclaim their land during the 
decades before 1994, they interacted with land activists who took up their cause.  The 
dispossessed were mostly converts to mission Christianity who had bought farms 
jointly at the turn of the 19th century.  Having distanced themselves from tribal forms 
of religion and authority, they combined peasant cultivation with labour migration 
before succumbing to the forced removals of grand apartheid (James 2000a; 2000b). 
The lawyers and activists were mainly white, middle-class, left/liberal people 
outraged by the inhumanity of these communities’ resettlement. The dealings between 
these sets of actors – so different in their social origins and yet converging on this 
morally-charged issue - produced a series of convictions concerning the nature of 
communal ownership: particularly, and misleadingly, concerning its egalitarian and 
inclusive character. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
3 In contrast, its twin legislation, the often-redrafted Communal Land Rights Bill, provoked major 
controversy concerning chiefs’ role and was yet to be passed at the time of writing. 
4 For the first view see “Didiza’s recipe for disaster”, Ben Cousins, Mail & Guardian 22 August 2000, 
“We can’t deliver the land, admits government”, Sharon Hammond and Justin Arenstein, Mail & 
Guardian 21 January 1999; for the second see “Community projects drown in ideology” Saliem Fakir, 
Mail & Guardian 1 July 1999. 
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An NGO-published booklet Botho Sechabeng/A feeling of community (1992), based 
on interviews with African titleholders, reveals strong convictions about the moral  
benefits of communal ownership and a certainty that individual title would lessen “the 
unity of the area by undermining the feeling of community”. Such convictions sprang, 
in part, from the threat or experience of resettlement.  Memories of an earlier 
existence, sharpened by the intensity of loss, had added an extra dimension to 
ordinary nostalgia (see Harries 1987).  The insistence on community solidarity was 
also partly tactical in nature (Pienaar 2000:329). Human rights lawyer-turned-Land-
Commissioner Durkje Gilfillan stressed the strategic necessity for concerted 
community action by all claimants if they were to persuade the government to take 
land claims seriously. Her advice did not constitute a mere machiavellian tactic, but 
was informed by ideas of egalitarian community central to a vision of reform shared 
by many South African activists. In its idealisation of African communality, it 
represents a misunderstanding - perhaps derived from a dichotomy between 
private/individual and communal ownership which prevailed in 19th century Western 
thought - of the collective element in traditional land tenure systems (Hann 
1998:321).5 
 
Interactions between activists and titleholders yielded other themes besides 
egalitarianism.  Alongside the image of the harmonious community emerges the 
darker picture of those excluded from titleholders’ lands.  Such lands had, in most 
cases, been purchased by groups of people wanting to set themselves apart from 
surrounding populations, often on the grounds that they, as mission Christians, 
eschewed the pagan ways of their neighbours.  Restitution provided an opportunity 
for at least some claimants to restate their opposition to sharing their territory with 
non-owners.  Human rights lawyers such as Gilfillan, despite a commitment to 
ensuring equitable land access for all, became aware in the course of their work with 
African owners that former tenants would have to be excluded in order to avoid 
reinstating the chaotic situations of uncontrolled land occupancy which had developed 
on African–owned land during the 1960s and 1970s (Gilfillan nd.:27-36).  Such 
lawyers, helping to design the new ownership models, were mindful of the need to 
                                                 
5 Evidence similar to that presented in this paper has subsequently caused Gilfillan, along with others in 
the human rights legal fraternity, to refine their ideas on communal ownership: they now favour a 
model of individual rights encompassed within a broader collective (personal communication). 
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establish secure rights of private ownership at the same time as enshrining communal 
ideals. It became clear that the land hunger of these former tenants would have to be 
satisfied by the purchase of other farms for redistribution: a setting in which the same 
private/communal models were also to be applied. 
 
Other precedents for the new ownership models likewise combined the demands of 
private ownership with those of communality, although initially privileging the 
former.  These were provided by “development experts” schooled in third-world 
agriculture. Policy-makers from the World Bank, initially attempting to lead but later 
influenced by South African opinion, attended a series of local workshops during the 
early 1990s where they made proposals to liberalise agriculture and to transform land 
ownership.  The resulting hybrid combined developers’ models, a reading of Kenyan 
land reforms of the 1950s, and a passing acquaintance with Bundy’s influential 1979 
book The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry.  The small family farm was 
initially proposed as the most efficient ownership unit, but subsequent persuasion by 
local land activists led to a modification of the proposal, allowing “communities and 
not only individuals to acquire land” (Hall and Williams 2003; Francis and Williams 
1993:398-9).6  Through these policy workshops, land reformers’ image of  
“communal property” were further shaped. 
 
The ideological and historical basis for South Africa’s new model of communal 
property thus stressed the value of community while suggesting the exclusivity of 
private ownership.  One precedent – the interaction between lawyers and dispossessed 
titleholders - was based upon previous experiences of landownership. The other, 
based on a version of international development discourse, posits an intended ideal of 
the future. The two have become merged into a standardized framework which offers 
owners a limited range of fixed alternatives (LRC Cape Town 2001).7  The 
prospective beneficiaries of land reform projects are all advised that they need to 
choose one out of the range of possible alternatives. Once the choice is made, a 
standard set of bureaucratic procedures follows.  A constitution is drawn up and 
                                                 
6 For joint analyses by World Bank and South African policy-makers, see Mbongwa et al (1996) and 
other articles published in Van Zyl et al (1996). 
7 CPA “is not so much one size fits all, but ..  in the early examples we … did not realise that if you do 
not give attention to how allocation would happen and be managed prior to transfer and settlement, it is 
very difficult if not impossible to do it later” (Kobus Pienaar, personal communication).  
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committee elections organized, the CPA or Trust is registered, and a certificate of 
ownership is issued.  The farm will now be officially owned – and governed – by its 
own particular “legal entity”.  
 
The choice of model has changed over time. In restitution cases initiated early in the 
1990s, the CPA, as an embodiment of the strong communal ethic involved in “getting 
land back”, was preferred and advocated by state and NGO officers alike.  As time 
went by it was realized that CPA ownership often led to a paralysis of decision-
making. Prospective buyers in a recent redistribution project, through a process of 
extensive “workshopping”, have instead opted for a Trust-style legal entity on the 
grounds that it will facilitate decisive action. They opted for a later transition to 
communal ownership “after land transfer, when the community has become close-
knit” (Amos Mathibela, interview).   
 
To give some idea of the contradictory nature of these newly-designed legal 
frameworks, and how far people relate to these as overly – or just sufficiently – 
modern or traditional, some case studies from Mpumalanga province will demonstrate 
their operation in specific contexts.     
 
Restitution: “exactly what they had before”? 
One case in which the interactions between restitution claimants and land activists 
produced an image of a strong community is that of the farm Doornkop, which in 
1994 was restored to the descendents of its original titleholders, adherents of a 19th-
century Lutheran mission.  The CPA to which the land was restored is governed by an 
elected committee. Its members are called upon to exercise considerable expertise and 
judgment, in technical matters of ownership as well as political ones of representation 
and governance.  The two areas often overlap.   
 
What complicates the already onerous duties of this committee is the social division 
between it and its constituents.  Socio-economic differentiation in the community, 
already entrenched when the farm’s occupants were forcibly removed in 1974, re-
emerged after the farm’s restitution in 1994 and became entrenched in 
leadership/rank-and-file divisions.  Those resettling on the farm relied on a mostly 
absentee elite – whom they elected to the committee - to represent their interests. 
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Apart from providing services like the water and residential housing, a major task for 
the committee was to deal with the re-emergence of tenancy on the farm. By 2001 
Doornkop had been invaded by more than 100 families of shack-dwellers who claim 
to have lived there in the pre-removal period.  Indeed, some poorer CPA members had 
“sold” plots, illegally, to these “squatters”, in an attempt to augment their meagre 
incomes. The rest of the community was divided over whether to evict or 
accommodate them.  The resulting crisis of leadership was exacerbated by uncertainty 
about exactly which land was owned by whom.  Residents claimed that if they had 
been certain of their specific property rights from early on (a matter of ownership), 
they – or their representatives, the CPA committee - would have been empowered to 
evict the squatters on their behalf (a matter of leadership) before the problem 
escalated.  Lack of certainty about property rights likewise caused vacillation amongst 
co-owners about holding other members of the CPA accountable.  Had there been less 
uncertainty, the illegal seller of land himself might have been more swiftly 
disciplined: 
he should lose his position - and his membership - with immediate effect. Otherwise, where are 
people going to get their idea of private property? If the mayor comes and explains, they do not 
understand. Different people say different things, and no one is clear on the Government's 
policies (Amos Mathibela, interview)  
 
Such a sense of uncertainty seems a far cry from the spirit of self-reliance which 
African titleholders pursued during the period of resistance against forced removals 
and immediately after reoccupying their land.  The earlier independence of these 
farms, originally deriving from Christians’ longstanding suspicion of outside 
interference from the state (James 2003), has now been augmented – but distorted - by 
the effects of private/communal ownership.  Ironically, at a time when restored 
owners are orienting themselves to take up full citizenship in the broader society, 
these farms have become, in effect, more separate than ever.   
 
On this point, human rights lawyers, continuing to engage in debates over communal 
ownership models and now willing to admit to what they see as their former mistakes, 
have been critical of CPAs’ separation from the public realm and of the corresponding 
reluctance of the state to intervene in their affairs.  They show how private/communal 
ownership induces uncertainty about the specific rights of individual members. 
Disputes between members, or inactive committees, may lead to the withholding of 
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the consent which is required by the CPA constitution in order for individuals to use 
or transfer their land, resulting in paralysis.  The remedy to this, according to lawyer 
Kobus Pienaar, lies in holding the state responsible, as it formerly was, “in respect of 
the allocation and ongoing administration of the rights of individuals to use the land”.  
It also lies in a clearer initial definition of people’s entitlements to specific assets: 
people’s rights “to various kinds of assets within the broader communally-owned unit 
must be ensured” (Kobus Pienaar, LRC, interview). Effectively, this is a call for the 
individual “sticks” in the “bundle” of rights to be more clearly specified: for an 
eradication of what Verdery calls the fuzziness of property (1999). 
 
These kinds of uncertainties, and the community conflicts which underpin but are also 
intensified by them, highlight the extent to which communally-owned “land reform” 
farms have come to be viewed as separate arenas -  
 
. . while the trust or communal property association tries to draw boundaries around itself to 
protect resources, it adds to the danger of creating an abnormally isolated zone (Lund 1998).   
 
- despite their occupants’ wish to exercise the citizenship rights of those in the broader 
society. 
 
Based on his experience with several CPA-owned properties, Pienaar asserted that 
such problems would be obviated by treating land reform beneficiaries as though they 
were governed by society’s normal legal frameworks, rather than by special forms of 
legislation.  The implication of this, he said, would be to recognize that the state has a 
role to play in administering relationships, and regulating conflict, between co-
owners, as much as it does between neighbours in a city context: 
Other property relations in society do get a lot of state support from local government, which 
helps to define your relationship with the street, your neighbours, the area in front of your house, 
and so on.  There are public institutions, like the Deeds Registry, the Surveyor-General’s office, 
which perform these functions.  … It is presumed that people in CPAs must take charge 
themselves, but no-one would expect this in the case of normal individually-owned property. 8 
 
The case of Doornkop shows that individual and communal aspects of ownership 
combine in ambiguous ways, resulting in many of the disadvantages of private 
                                                 
8 In his growing awareness of the problems of communal awareness Pienaar shares the attitudes of 
others in the human rights legal fraternity, such as Gilfillan (cited earlier).  All have come to recognize 
a point made – independently – by Hann: that, although African patterns of landholding have some 
collectivist elements, these do not equate to communal farming a la African socialism (Hann 
1998:321). 
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ownership with few of its concomitant benefits.  A model of communality, combined 
with inattention to the precise nature and content of property rights, has served to 
paralyse leaders. 
 
In reaction, landholders have reverted to models of chiefly authority and ownership: 
somewhat surprisingly, given their history.  Doornkop’s purchasers had separated 
themselves geographically from the wellsprings of chiefly power in the late 1800s, 
and had long insisted on elected rather than traditional forms of leadership.  During 
the 1980s and 90s, the farm’s claimants were speaking scornfully of all forms of 
patrimonial authority.  But by the early 2000s they were sufficiently disillusioned 
with committee-style CPA government to be idealizing the chiefship in retrospect: 
We thought there would have been a chief here - if so, he would have been responsible for 
everything (Eva Mankge, interview) 
 
These sentiments were echoed by a claimant at another restitution farm:  
Now we have no master. We are ruled by a hundred rats, not by one lion. There are many 
committees ruling us now - we prefer to be ruled by just one chief (Simon Tsehla, interview). 
 
A land researcher to whom I mentioned these attitudes agreed that there had been a 
general reawakening of chiefship in South Africa, in reaction against the putatively 
“democratic” alternative  
chiefs are seen as champions – strong people with clout, not people bogged down by 
bureaucracy.  People think, “if only we had a strong leader”…. One can relate this to the appeal 
of authoritarianism to the poor in other settings (Ed Lahiff, interview). 
 
Such sentiments, rather than being seen as a wholehearted endorsement of traditional 
leadership, represent a critical commentary on the opacity and ineffectiveness of CPA 
committees: groups of (mostly male) office-holders whose deliberations and 
machinations are a mystery to most, who fail to deliver on numerous promises of 
development, and who in many cases do not even live on the restored farms but travel 
there infrequently from the cities where they reside and work. Similar problems, 
widely reported, suggest profound flaws in the assumption – enshrined in the original 
legislation - that communal landholding would automatically be translated into 
harmonious and conflict-free leadership. Instead, there is a “breakdown of 
communication between the leadership and members”, as well as “inequitable 
allocation of assets based on self help; mismanagement; the squandering of 
opportunity; a disregard for internal rules”.  The result has been that “infrastructure 
 13 
and land are left to deteriorate” (Pienaar 2000:327). In the face of such problems, 
chiefs appear to present an alternative model of ownership/leadership which contrasts 
favourably with government by committee.  
 
The “tragedy”, here, appears to be that no-one has sufficient authority and clout to act 
in the way that truly “private” owners of land might do.  Instead they revert to a 
misremembered past in which chiefs acted with decisiveness and authority rather than 
being crippled by indecision and doubt.  
 
Redistribution: “future-oriented”? 
In the new South Africa, as with other regimes focused on reforming land ownership, 
there has been consciousness of a need to provide distributive justice alongside 
reparative justice, since the latter focuses entirely on historical conditions without 
taking into account the dynamics of the present or the demands of the future (see van 
Meijl, this volume).  If restitution was a backward-looking enterprise, redistribution 
appeared to promise new, future-oriented ideals of community, oriented towards 
progressive forms of social organization and exemplifying the best features that 
modern technical/legal planning could offer.   
 
Planners have attempted to meet the challenge – along the lines outlined by Pienaar, 
above - by disaggregating the “bundle” and specifying the precise content of different 
kinds of entitlements and obligations.  Enlightened policy should, it is thought, solve 
the problems posed by the failure of existing projects. The case of two redistribution 
farms exemplifies this.  One is the earlier-settled – and “failed” – Sizanani. The other, 
Siyathuthuka, is presently being designed to forestall a similar “failure”. 
 
Sizanani has been seen by many commentators as a casualty of the early, “rent-a-
crowd” era of redistribution, in which beneficiaries have pooled their grants despite 
conflicting interests and taken over commercial operations which they have 
insufficient capacity to run.9   Problems have included mismanagement, financial 
shortages (insufficient funds remained after purchase to initiate an “agricultural 
                                                 
9 “Land Affairs Divides and Conquers”, Ann Eveleth, Mail & Guardian, April 20 1999; “Didiza’s 
recipe for disaster” Ben Cousins, Mail & Guardian, August 22, 2000; similar opinions were held by 
Philip Mbiba, Rosalie Kingwill and Chris Mulaudzi (interviews). 
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project”), and unsustainably large numbers (determined by the purchase price rather 
than by commonality of interests). The purchase was initiated by a member of the 
new political elite in the region on behalf of a group of farm labourers who needed a 
place to live. When extra members were then recruited so as to be able to afford the 
farm, this led to the inclusion of the names of people who did not intend to participate 
but had been persuaded to be listed in order that their government grants be accessed.   
 
The prospects of effective representation were slim from the outset, but were made 
even more remote by the group’s members’ lack of experience of commercial 
agriculture, finance, or business. Although many had worked on farms, their 
habituation to a decades-old despotic regime as labourers for white farmers made 
egalitarian models of participatory democracy unfamiliar:  
The problem they have is with management.  There are seven families who are working on the 
farm from the previous farm owner.  They do have experience with farming but the previous 
farm owner was in the position of farm manager and they were working by instruction.  But now 
they need a person who can manage them - and they … have this problem of not respecting any 
of their own members (JB Mahlangu, interview).  
 
The remedy proposed in the case of this farm, as in that of many like it, was to 
appoint an outside expert with managerial and commercial farming experience to run 
the farm in the interim, and to share his knowledge with the new owners. In a 
somewhat grotesque caricature of earlier apartheid practice, the person proposed – in 
this as in similar cases – was the former white farm owner:  
 
But not all CPA members were enthusiastic about accepting his help.  In cahoots with 
a relative well-connected in the tourist industry he made proposals – while a 
neighbouring farmer competed for the post of manager by making counter-proposals - 
about running the farm  Each informed the committee about the fees, generated out of 
future profits, they would be charging.  In the face of these conflicting ideas, the 
recently-elected CPA committee members felt bewildered and unable to assert 
themselves: and resentful at the promises made which, as they later said, were “never 
fulfilled”. They were thus relieved when development agents from the parastatal 
Eskom confirmed their suspicions by telling them  
not to work with any white people, because they are going to rob us and later dispossess us of 
our farm.  Whites are the ones who make us suffer (Driver Ntuli, interview). 
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Such assurances seemed to provide a sense of security by pointing to a mutually-
agreed-upon enemy which could be blamed for the CPA’s, and the farm’s, 
misfortunes.  But it remains to be seen whether Eskom’s agents , who in turn plan to 
outsource the training of Sizanani’s owners to two black-owned companies of 
“service providers”, are more reliable than the earlier candidates for the position of 
manager.  What will certainly remain true for the foreseeable future is the 
perpetuation of the CPA’s present sense of dependency.  Although the representatives 
of Eskom and of the Department of Agriculture were shrilly insistent that Sizanani’s 
farmer/owners must now be independent rather than continuing to rely on 
employment by white farmers, many of the owners felt pessimistic about being able to 
make an independent living on the land and were hence reluctant to relinquish their 
jobs as labourers on white farms, as this extract from my field diary shows:  
 
Meeting at Sizanani, 26th January 2003 
George Mahlaela (from Eskom Development Foundation): You no longer work at makgoweng (the 
place of the whites) - makgoweng is here, work is here. You are the farmers - you are your own bosses. 
Your children are your eyes and your ears, they must be involved. Do not come and tell us that your 
children are in town working.  You must get here in time for meetings. This place belongs to you.  
Female CPA member: If we start farming, who's going to pay for this? Will we be paid if we start to 
farm here?  …What is the government going to do? When are they going to give us water, electricity, 
and so on? When is electricity going to be laid on here? 
George: These things will be settled by the service providers. … 
(Some people get up and start to leave. Rose Msibi gets upset.)  
Rose: We want to have a general meeting every month. …  We would like to have the meeting on a 
week day – this will force people to attend and thus to stop their work on farms. …  People should not 
be working on farms here. You're your own bosses - you are like whites. 
Male CPA member: If you have it in the week, some will come, and those who are working will not.  
George: We could have it at 5 o'clock, or 6 o'clock, to accommodate them.  
(They take a vote to hold it on a weekday afternoon).  
Male CPA member: (defiantly) I cannot make it in the week - I work on a farm.  
(Everybody laughs). 
 
This exchange shows the state and its agents attempting to foist the responsibilities of 
ownership onto beneficiaries.  While employees of the state or of parastatal 
development agencies attempt to reshape reality by portraying Sizanani’s members as 
independent owners responsible for their own future prosperity, the members 
themselves recognize that their poverty will continue to render them reliant on white 
farm employment and on state welfare, even though the former is dwindling and the 
state has shown itself increasingly unwilling to provide the latter.   
 
The perceived failure of communal ownership and responsibility in projects such as 
Sizanani has led to an increasing emphasis on new models which allow for the 
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individualization of rights.  Given that the CPA ownership model is flawed, there are 
increasing moves towards models of ownership which – as originally suggested by the 
World Bank – privilege the family farm or foreground the individual entrepreneur.  
But land functionaries continue to design projects for groups of “landless” people who 
still feel unable to own or run properties as individuals. In Mpumalanga, as elsewhere, 
many of these are displaced farm labourers.  There were those who early on became 
the beneficiaries of Sizanani. There are the “squatters” who invaded Doornkop and 
settled there without any immediate prospects of a land reform project or CPA.  These 
are the intended “beneficiaries” of Siyathuthuka.  In this case, individual ownership 
within-the-commons has been perfected – at least in theory.  
 
Planning: technical solutions to political problems 
In the process of making new plans to overcome old problems, consultants gain 
considerable experience. They develop expertise at constructing “business plans” for 
use on communally-held lands.  These plans, with their complex provisions for sub-
letting of communal property and the like, made up for the failure of earlier CPA 
constitutions to specify individual rights to assets.  Manifesting a pattern well-known 
in third-world development, technical solutions were thus beginning to substitute for 
legal or political ones (Robertson 1984; Ferguson 1990).   
 
In preparing to purchase a redistribution farm where squatters would be settled, the 
consultants drew up a business plan. It allocated resources in such a way as to avoid a 
“tragedy of the commons” scenario in which a failure of responsible leadership results 
in wasting assets.  The “commons” here have been conceptualized as an asset, owned 
by the Trust, which members must lease:  
“the Trust will be responsible to collect rent from each beneficiary and people operating small 
businesses that will then be used to maintain infrastructure and to pay for services”. 10 
 
The specified grazing arrangements are similar: 
an amount of R5 to R10 per month per head is paid to the Trust for the grazing. … The reason 
why a rent should be asked is that the property belongs to all the beneficiaries collectively and 
that those that use the grazing use the assets of other individuals; it is therefore reasonable for 
the advantaged to compensate the others for the use of the Trust’s common assets (ibid.:11). 
 
                                                 
10 “A business plan for the settlement of the Siyathuthuka Trust of Doornkop”, Fundile Africa, Pretoria, 
2002. 
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The consultant laid out the rationale for this co-operative ownership schema, claiming 
that its “somewhat autocratic” nature was necessary in the interests of sustainability.  
 
This sophisticated model attempts to compensate, through elaborate technical 
specifications, for the ambiguities entrenched in the legal outlining of communal 
property arrangements.  At the same time as guaranteeing the proper custodianship of 
“the commons”, it thus appears - though on a technical rather than legal level - to 
satisfy some of the requirements outlined earlier for a clearer initial definition of 
people’s rights over specific assets.   
 
This plan entailed two drawbacks, however.  It conceived of rights as something 
earned through continuous enterprise rather than guaranteed by the state.  Using a 
commercial model, it seemed to embody an assumption that cattle-owners would be 
generating cash income from their enterprises, and would thus be in a position to pay 
rent to the Trust.  In this way it seemed to be out of kilter with the priorities of most 
squatters, who kept cattle as a form of long-term saving but were reluctant or unable 
to make ongoing monthly investments such as payment for grazing. Instead of 
assuring the citizen’s inalienable entitlements as pledged by the state, the plan 
proposed a model of citizenship based on post-welfarist propositions about self-
sustaining individual enterprise.  
 
A second drawback lay in the plan’s misrecognition of existing social realities.  In the 
same way that it seemed to take little account of members’ incomes by failing to 
recognize that few were in a position to pay rent for grazing, it also ignored both their 
aspirations and their shortcomings on the level of managerial or organizational skills. 
In both these respects, the consultant’s plan thus continued to fall into the trap of the 
communal property plans which it was attempting to transcend.  Without extensive 
state intervention and agricultural support it was unlikely that its way of “privatizing 
the commons” would be able to be put into practice.   
 
That squatters’ aspirations were being ignored had already become evident to me 
from several interviews: 
… we don’t want it. … In fact, they have gone behind our backs.  Firstly, we were told to simply 
register our names and we later realized that our housing grants were used without our consent 
to buy the farm (Ephraim and Fanie Mabuza, interview)  
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Such objections, based on the communal/trusteeship model of the homelands (Murray 
1992:132. passim), but newly-reconstituted as a form of resistance against the state’s 
plans for private land ownership, were founded on a model in which the state should 
be the rightful owner and custodian of land. 
 
That there was a misrecognition of the lack of managerial and organizational skills 
was suggested by the father of Siyathuthuka Trust’s chairman. The problem with 
business plans, he said, was that they were too complex for ordinary people to 
understand.  The “workshopping” beloved of both state and NGO practitioners in the 
land sector did little to improve matters: 
Now we have people driving from Pretoria, ….  They talk, talk, and not a single person will ask 
a question.  Have they understood or not?  Its not that they are scared, it’s that they don’t 
understand (Hendrik Mathibela, interview).  
 
What made these workshops worse, he implied, was that the elaborateness of their 
abstract plans was matched by a failure to deliver any material, practical progress.  
Land for the squatters was forever being discussed at meetings but never handed over.  
He likened this to a meal much planned-for but never actually forthcoming: 
You can’t tell people “I have made food; I’m going to give you food”, from the morning till the 
sun goes down – people are waiting.  Tomorrow when you we say “we must go and eat”, they 
say, “there’s no food”. .  (ibid.) 
 
All-in-all, he was suggesting, the designing of complex plans for commercial farming 
was serving only to frustrate those for whom the plans had been made.  While they 
would have been happy to settle for a much simpler solution, the process of planning 
was serving to render all solutions equally remote and hence promoting passivity 
among those planned-for. His account certainly confirmed squatter shortcomings on 
the level of “managerial skills”, but suggested that to require such skills was 
inappropriate in the circumstances.  
 
It would appear, then, that consultants’ technical elaborations on the communal 
property theme, although seeming to promise a fine-tuning of the original crude 
model, were so complex as to be virtually incomprehensible to their intended 
recipients.  Although they might, with much public support, have been realizable, it 
was precisely this support that was becoming increasingly rare under the new 
privatizing regime.  While much was being invested by the state to pay for consultants 
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to design sophisticated property regimes, implementing these was generally left to 
communities with very little assistance or expertise. Indeed, the state’s “hands-off” 
approach was being justified with such statements as “the point of land redistribution 
is to give a community their land, not run it for them” and the insistence that they 
“have to be more accountable for their own fate”.11  In the absence of “post-
settlement support”, the assumption was that plans could be conveyed to their 
recipients through “workshops”.  In a manner which has been widely noted in the 
world of development, this embodied a presumption that more effective channels of 
communication would enable planners’ modernizing paradigm to be shared by those 
planned-for, and ignorance replaced by rational knowledge (Hobart 1993).  
 
In the one-size-fits-all world of communal property, things are not as they seem.  In 
the case of restitution communities, it was presumed that their origin in longstanding 
group ties would provide precedents for democratic communal ownership.  Instead, 
members ended up crying out for a return to a traditional model based on chiefly 
custodianship.  But this call for despotism disguised a demand for state involvement 
and for the continuation of apartheid’s particular version – albeit a partial one – of 
welfarist, modernist planning. Redistribution groups, in contrast, appeared to promise 
a future untrammeled by communalist precedents: they provided a blank slate upon 
which consultants’ increasingly sophisticated schemas of entrepreneurial modernity 
and private ownership could be drawn.  Instead, and in reaction, participants longed 
wistfully for apartheid’s model of tribal/custodial landholding.  This apparently 
regressive vision, however, masked ideas about democratic-style modernity. Deriving 
from the election’s promises of egalitarianism and participatory democracy, 
redistribution beneficiaries expressed their convictions that there should be wide 
consultation about future outcomes rather than allowing planners to “go behind our 
backs”.  
 
Inalienable or alienable land? 
If landed property becomes alienable and short-term gain outweighs long-term 
considerations, the public aspects of property may atrophy (Hann 1998:33). It remains 
briefly to mention the risk to newly-installed private owners of alienating land 
altogether.  
                                                 
11 “Shattered dreams of the San” Yolandi Groenewald, Mail and Guardian 10th June 2003.. 
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The possibility of land loss through indebtedness has loomed like a shadow in the 
background of South Africa’s land reform program, threatening communal/private 
ownership.  One such case is that of the Khomani San in the Northern Cape Province 
whose land was restored in the 1990s. When CPA members incurred large debts from 
a local white shopkeeper (the former owner of one of the farms), the debtors decided, 
without the necessary mandate from all committee members, to auction that farm in 
order to settle the debt.12  As an interim solution, the Director-General of Land Affairs 
was pressed into custodianship of the CPA. In the case of the “rural poor”, then, the 
state has continued to intervene, partly under pressure from those in the NGO sector, 
in order to ensure that the gains made under land reform are not prematurely lost.13 
 
It is too early in the “new look” phase of land reform to assess whether land alienation 
is occurring amongst the higher-income individual owners now beginning to be 
favoured as beneficiaries of the program. There are, however, suggestions that a 
cautious approach which combines Land Bank loans with leasing and long-term 
payback arrangements to former owners will safeguard at least some land 
redistributed to commercial African farmers. The state’s increasing predilection for 
such schemes has, however, been criticized by those on the left who feel that it is 
neglecting “the poor”.  In defence of this new approach, officers point to its likelihood 
of greater sustainability than earlier rent-a-crowd schemes. But the history of African 
landownership tells us that even the middle classes, for whose identity and status 
landowning formed such a crucial basis, have fallen prey and might again succumb to 
land loss.  Whether in 1890s Natal (La Hausse 2000), or during the 1930s in the 
Orange Free State (Murray 1992), the risk always existed that mortgage debts might 
be unrepayable and thus that land would be forfeit.  Such owners, being reliant on 
sources of income other than farming, were susceptible to downturns in the economy 
which threatened their non-farm sources of finance, such as migrant labour, transport 
riding or “shack farming” (La Hausse 2000:161-4); or leasing land to whites who 
would farm it instead (Murray 1992:98). Both cases illustrate the exceptional 
                                                 
12 “San risk losing their land” Yolandi Groenewald, Mail and Guardian, 15th September 2002. 
13 It is possible in this case that the intervention of the state was perceived as more feasible – and more 
desirable - because it was a case involving indigenous people, often seen as closer to nature, more 
vulnerable, less likely to be able to protect themselves.   
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vulnerability of African farm owners in situations where the economic, legal and 
political odds were against them.  Although African owners now enjoy greater favour 
than they did in earlier historical periods, the present setting has its own risks. Since 
well before the 1994 transition, the state has been unwilling to provide farmer support 
as it once did: indeed, many of the white farmers selling to the state for land reform 
have become heavily indebted since the withdrawal of such support in the late 1980s.  
Middle-class land loss thus remains a distinct possibility.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The context of property-holding in South Africa is one of political transition: a 
context in which all models of ownership appear to be negotiable and under redesign. 
The change of regime presented an ideal opportunity to unbundle the complex 
components of the property package, selecting only the most appropriate parts and 
streamlining property ownership to suit a changed dispensation. To the most utopian 
land activists and their constituents, it seemed to promise a chance for renegotiation of 
some of the most fundamental inequalities in society, by combining the independence 
of land-owning with the security of state support. 
 
The resulting models combined private and public, modern and traditional, in 
unexpected ways. There is the still-resilient commitment to communal ownership by 
civil society activists, human rights lawyers and consultants, partly drawing on but 
partly being imposed upon their constituents’ views. There is the co-ownership of 
property by better- and worse-off people, with the poor concomitantly dependent on 
their richer counterparts to represent them or serve as intermediaries.  Different 
models of property thus converge and their boundaries blur. 
 
Historical struggles and contemporary disputes over land and the way it ought – or 
ought not – to be owned have left their imprint upon present-day policy and practice.  
The past weighs heavy and leaves its imprint, enshrining a view of apparent 
communality which leaves in place many of the features of individual property.  
When the private/communal model was found to be problematic and unsuited to the 
demands of redistributive justice, planners attempted to refine it by specifying 
individual entitlements in greater detail. But the resultant models of property-holding 
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are overly complex.  They also rely on a presumption about the capacity of poor 
people to behave as investors and rent-payers.  As a result, the poor and landless 
appear to be excluded as real “beneficiaries” of land reform.  Unable to benefit from 
private ownership, they press for protection from its dangers. They affirm apartheid’s 
familiar model of customary landholding, which seems to promise land as an 
inalienable right. Resisting the state’s insistence on private property, they insist on 
their own interpretation: that “land cannot be bought and sold – it is for everyone”.   
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